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State Department R&S Staffing

To:  Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

From:  David W. Callaway, MD

Re:   The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Staffing Options for Creation of a Civilian Reserve Corps

Overview:  The memo outlines the basic challenges facing the creation and maintenance of the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) as a component of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) Civilian Response Corps. 

S/CRS Mission:  In July 2004, NSPD-44 authorized the Department of State to create S/CRS and, "To lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."[i]  The functional structure of the S/CRS is comprised of an Active Response Corps (ARC), Standby Reserve Corps (SRC) and the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) [Appendix 1]. 

Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC):  The CRC will be comprised of experts from state and local government, NGO, private contractors who volunteer of a 4 year term and can be deployed for up to 1 year.  CRC activation is limited to major USG SR engagements and requires presidential authorization.[ii]

Challenges for staffing CRC:  The S/CRS has stated a staffing goal of 500 CRC personnel by the end of FY2008.  Of this number, 350 will be dedicated to security and rule of law, including 120 police officers [Appendix 2].  In May 2007, Congress authorized State to reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain the CRC but did not grant the authority to State to obligate these funds.[iii]  DOD has transferred and additional $100 million 1207 funds to assist in S/CRS planning and operations.  A 2007 GAO report and 2008 RAND Corporation review highlighted several recruiting and human resource challenges in standing up the CRC.  The challenges can be broadly categorized into "requirements", "recruitment/ retention" and "organization".

1. Requirements: State must define a mission for the CRC. State has deferred on drafting a formal mission statement for the CRC, incorrectly asserting that "similar entities such as the military reserve, do not maintain lists of possible deployments and are not limited to certain missions specified in advance." (Response to GAO-08-39). In fact, military reserve components do have specified missions (e.g. artillery, infantry, military police or medical). These reservists have frequently been employed beyond their Military Occupation Specialties (MOS), but this is not ideal. Action: State must draft a mission statement for the CRC that includes terms of activation, types of mission (e.g. conflict prevention, mitigation or resolution) general duties, and training requirements. Without this basic framework, State will be unable to adequately implement a staffing plan.

2. Recruitment: State faces a crisis of legitimacy in field operations. To address this perception, S/CRS should recruit personnel with prior field experience and offer them reasonable employment benefits.

a. Target populations: It is critical that S/CRS personnel are willing to leave "the compound", live in austere environments and be willing to deploy for extended periods. Recruiting should specifically target former Special Forces and Civil Affair soldiers, combat veterans with leadership experience, returned Peace Corps volunteers, recent State Department retirees with overseas experience and active NGO employees. State should also consider targeting businesses to provide "corporate teams". The government could offer tax incentives, publicize commitments to "national service" and strengthen employment benefits to promote this public-private venture. Retirees also offer a unique target population. There are an increasing number of retirees looking for second careers. State could offer flexible benefits package (e.g. loan repayment, mortgage deferral, IRA contributions, etc) to leverage the experience of these personnel. Finally, State should consider employing foreign born nationals and first generation citizens as CRC instructors or deployable assets.

b. Essential benefits: Federal benefits for CRC personnel must include health and life insurance, equitable promotion schedule and accrual of "time to retirement", relocation and retention incentives, and danger pay.

c. Terms of employment: Upon activation, CRC personnel become "full-time federal employees" with employment benefits and rights (DOS web). However, several critical issues are not addressed that will limit CRC recruitment. First, there is no legislative protection of reemployment rights. All other federal reserve models (e.g. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, Military Reserve, and National Guard) include some protection of reemployment rights. Lack of this provision will result in a disproportionate reliance on private contractors to fill expertise gaps and will undermine the underlying philosophical "national service"- based argument for CRC. The lack of reemployment rights is the single greatest threat to the successful creation of a functional CRC. In addition to reemployment rights, State must provide CRC personnel with health and life insurance, equitable promotion schedule and accrual of "time to retirement", relocation and retention incentives, danger pay, and potentially, preference of post.

3.  Organization: Currently, there is no organizational model for staffing the CRC.  There are several existing "reserve" models utilized by the federal government that should be considered when designing the Civilian Reserve Corps.

a. Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT): DMATs are locally sponsored teams of volunteer medical and disaster professionals who maintain Memorandums of Understanding with the US. Public Health Service allowing them to be "federalized" and rapidly deploy in response to natural, accidental or intentional disasters. DMAT personnel reemployment rights are protected under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act which is regulated by the U.S. Department of Labor. [Appendix 3].

b. Military Reserve Structure: S/CRS could model the CRC on existing Military Reserve infrastructure, recruitment, benefits, administration and human resources. This model has several advantages. First, capitalizing on an existing model will expedite program implementation. Second, utilizing a military model will allow improved interagency understanding and streamline the administrative process for activating civilians who will ultimately work side-by-side with military personnel. Third, the military reserve system has a well defined benefits, promotion, reemployment and education system that can serve as a model for CRC. Finally, the model allows a great deal of flexibility. For example, CRC personnel be tasked to deploy or they could be utilized to "back fill" regional or national federal government positions vacated by SRC personnel. This flexibility will strengthen CRC recruitment, address supporting agency concerns about staff depletion and allow for more tailored national response.

c. Pure Civilian contractors: S/CRS has identified a reliance on civilian contractors to successfully conduct stabilization operations. This reliance has several potential political implications. The most obvious of which is that "contractors" are not "volunteers" filling billets in Civilian Reserve Corps. S/CRS should define specific conditions in which private contractors will be employed such as, billets requiring high tech skills, advanced linguistic capabilities, information technology, etc. In its utilization of civilian contractors, S/CRS should look to capitalize on experience in the NGO development and humanitarian communities. In addition, success will rely on emphasizing flexibility of funding, operations, innovation. Preestablished contracts with public-private sector companies, "standing contract authority", and a "ready to use" contracting mechanism are critical in this process.

4.  Regional Organization of CRC:  The CRC should be regionalized in its recruitment, staffing, infrastructure, headquarters and area of operations (AOR).  One solution is to model the CRC on the U.S. Army Special Forces [Appendix 3].  In this model, State would divide the Nation into recruiting regions that would house a CRC headquarters element.  Each region would have a numbered team corresponding to the respective SF teams.  The domestic regions would  have a specific international AOR and therefore have some degree of language and cultural specialization.  For example, CRC Team 7 would be based out of Dallas, TX or Miami, FL and focus on R&S missions in Latin and South America. The HQ would be responsible for recruitment, human resources, training, deployment support and coordination with the main S/CRS office.  This model allows for maximum flexibility in training, deployment, and regional back fill while facilitating the recruitment of qualified personnel who posses requisite language and cultural skills.

5.  Conclusions:  State must commit to S/CRS and create an experienced, expeditionary diplomatic corps with a dedicated reserve component.  Critical to this success are clarity of mission, reemployment rights, and a functional staffing model.  S/CRS should look to existing staffing models, and integrate existing QRF programs.

Appendix 1:  Proposed S/CRS Operational Structure

1. Active Response Corps (ARC): Full time federal employees within the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization with specific tasks of planning, programming and operations related to S/CRS mission. These personnel will be drawn from 8 agencies- specifically mentioned were DoJ, USAID, DoE, and CRS. These personnel will report directly to the Secretary of State. S/CRS has identified the need for 250 ARC personnel. The teams will be 100% operational and be ready to deploy in less than 48 hours.

2. Standby Reserve Corps (SRC): SRC employees will be full time employees of non- Department of State agencies with ancillary commitment to S/CRS. S/CRS has identified a staffing goal of 2000 personnel. The 8:1 ratio of SRC:ARC is designed to accommodate a goal of 10% deployability within 30 days of an event.

3. Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC): The CRC will be comprised of non- U.S. Government volunteers from local and state government, NGOs or the private sector who maintain basic annual training requirements and are ready to deploy at least 25% strength within 30-60 days of an event. The Department of State's goal staffing for the CRC is 2000 volunteers.

4. Proposed SRC and CRC Composition (by S/CRS): Law enforcement personnel and trainers, rule of law experts (e.g. Lawyers), diplomats, public health, development specialists, economists, public administrators, engineers, intelligence, educators, conflict management (authors suggestions).

 Appendix 2:  Disaster Medical Augmentation Team Background

(from http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/ndms/teams/dmat.html)

General:  DMAT is a group of professional and para-professional medical personnel (supported by a cadre of logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide medical care during a disaster or other event. National Disaster Management System (NDMS) recruits personnel for specific vacancies, plans for training opportunities, and coordinates the deployment of the team.  DMATs are designed to be a rapid-response element to supplement local medical care until other Federal or contract resources can be mobilized, or the situation is resolved. DMATs deploy to disaster sites with sufficient supplies and equipment to sustain themselves for a period of 72 hours while providing medical care at a fixed or temporary medical care site. The personnel are activated for a period of two weeks. DMATs are principally a community resource available to support local, regional, and State requirements. However, as a National resource they can be federalized

DMAT financial compensation:  DMAT members are paid only while on a federal deployment (authorized under a travel authorization) and/or for non-deployment work authorized by the team Commander within NDMS (National Disaster Medical System) budget guidelines. DMAT members, following a formal federal employment process, become "intermittent" federal employees. Federal pay grades are determined during the federal employment process and ranges are preset for all team positions. Otherwise the time is often shared between the person's volunteer hours and their employer.  DMAT personnel have the protection of the Federal Tort Claims Act in which the Federal Government becomes the defendant in the event of a malpractice claim.

Medical Care:  Injuries are covered for team members as federal employees during deployments and during approved functional exercises (2 per year) but not during didactic training or team meetings.  

Relevant Legal Acts:

1. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA): In general terms, a team member must give the employer notice (if possible) if a deployment is about to occur, the employer must provide for a leave of absence for a federally activated team member and the team member must be re-employed following a deployment. http://www.esgr.org/userra.asp.

2. "DoD Directive 1235.10 (October 24, 1986) Implements those provisions of law that pertain to the order of units and individual members of the Reserve Components to active duty in support of operational missions contingency operations, during a national emergency, or in time of war. This Directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the ordering to active duty, and the managing of the reserve components, during periods when members of the reserve components serve on active duty under Section 12301(a) of reference Title 10, United States Code.

Appendix 3:  Regional CRC Teams

[i]  Department of State webpage.   http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm

[ii] Kelly TK, Tunstall EE, Szayna TS and Prine DW.  Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities.  RAND Corporation, 2008.  ISBN 978-0-8330-4137-1

[iii] GAO- 08-39. Stabilization and Reconstruction:  Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps. November 2007